

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 IAEA V 00642 01 OF 02 241713Z

43

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-10 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15

RSC-01 CIAE-00 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 OES-03 FEAE-00

DODE-00 PA-01 USIA-06 PRS-01 ACDE-00 AF-06 ARA-06

EA-06 NEA-09 DLOS-03 COA-01 /110 W  
----- 027770

P R 241627Z JAN 75

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5419

INFO AEC GERMANTOWN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 0642

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: IAEA PARM UR US

SUBJ: US/USSR PNE BILATERAL AND IAEA TECHNICAL PNE MEETINGS

REF : STATE 15850

1. SUMMARY: PARS 2 TO 3 REPORT ON SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR DRAFT PRIVATE COMMUNIQUE AND RESPONSE TO INQUIRY WHICH HAD BEEN MODIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS (REFTEL). PARA 4 DISCUSSES THE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS WHICH WERE APPROVED BY THE PNE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE AT TODAY'S PANEL SESSION. PARA 5 CONSITITUTES A LISTING OF ITEMS WHICH AROSE DURING THE IAEA MEETING WHICH SHOULD PROVIDE USEFUL INSIGHTS IN PREPARING FOR RESUMPTION OF THE TTB/PNE NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY

2. FOLLOWING TODAY'S FINAL PLENARY, FLEMING, MARCUM AND LABOWITZ MET WITH MYASNIKOV, ANTIASOV AND MISHARIN TO DISCUSS THE US DRAFT RESPONSE TO INQUIRY AND PRIVATE COMMUNIQUE WHICH HAD BEEN MODIFIED AS PER REFTEL. WITH REGARD TO THE RESPONSE TO INQUIRY, WE EXPLAINED THAT WE DID NOT PLAN PUBLIC RELEASE, BUT WOULD NOT OBJECT TO SOVIET RELEASE (PARA 2, REFTEL. SOVIETS ACCEPTED TEXT, BUT MADE STRONG PLEA FOR ADDITION OF FOLLOWING CLAUSE TO FINAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 IAEA V 00642 01 OF 02 241713Z

SENTENCE: QUOTE . . . IN THE IEAE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THEIR

RESPONSIBILITIES IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE V OF THE NPT END QUOTE. THEY STRESSED THAT THE WORD "THEIR" IN THIS SENTENCE REFERRED TO US/SOVIET RESPONSIBILITIES, NOT IAEA. US REPRESENTATIVES STRESSED THAT OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS HAD ONLY BEEN IN CONTEXT OF PREPARING FOR IAEA MEETING AND AS AGREED BY SOVIETS HAD NOT INCLUDED NPT ISSUES. SOVIETS ARGUED STRONGLY FOR INCLUSION OF THIS NPT ARTICLE V REFERENCE, CITING THAT BOTH US AND SOVIET DEL CHAIRMEN HAD ACKNOWLEDGED ITS IMPORTANCE DURING TTB/PNE NEGOTIATIONS AND, MOREOVER, IT WOULD BE SUEFUL TO BOTH SIDES, TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO SUCH DISCUSSIONS AS RELEVANT TO UNGA RES CALLING FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO REPORT TO MAY 1975 NPT REV CON CONCERNING CONCLUSION OF SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ENVISAGED IN NPT ARTICLE V. US REPRESENTATIVES AGREED TO REPORT SOVIET VIEW TO WASHINGTON.

3. PRIVATE COMMUNIQUE WAS THEN DISCUSSED. SOVIETS HAD PRESENTED CALCULATIONS EXPLICITLY SUPPORTING DOWNWARD REVISION OF RADIATION EXPOSURE TO 5 TO 10 PERCENT FROM 10 PERCENT (PARA 5, REFTEL) AND INSISTED ON HAVING THIS INFORMATION IN COMMUNIQUE WHICH WE ACCEPTED. SOVIETS WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT US DELETION OF SENTENCE DRAWN FROM 1971 PRIVATE COMMUNIQUE (PARA 4C, REFTEL) AND ASKED US TO RECONSIDER ITS DELETION. THEY ARGUED THAT THIS TECHNICAL CONCLUSION HAD BEEN AGREED TO IN 1971 AND THEY FELT IT REMAINED VALID. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION, WE AGREED TO REPORT SOVIET VIEWS TO WASHINGTON.

4. AT CONCLUSION OF IAEA MEETINGS, A SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS WAS ACCEPTED BY PNE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE WHICH CONSISTED OF A FACTUAL DISCUSSION OF THE PAPERS PRESENTED DURING THE MEETINGS. THIS SUMMARY IS STILL BEING EDITED AND WILL BE FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON BY THE MISSION AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE. A SET OF SEVEN CONCLUSIONS WAS THEN PRESENTED FOR DISCUSSION. ASIDE FROM MINOR ALTERATIONS, ONLY THE SECOND CONCLUSION, WHICH DEALT WITH RADIATION STANDARDS, WAS OBJECTIONABLE TO THE USDEL. THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGE WAS: QUOTE MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF LARGE CRATERING PROJECTS REQUIRES THE DEFINITION OF ACCEPTABLE RADIATION EXPOSURE LIMITS AND PARTICULARLY OF LONG DISTANCE FALL OUT LEVELS. A USEFUL AREA OF ACTIVITY FOR THE AGENCY MIGHT BE TO SEEK TO DEVELOP CRITERIA WHICH COULD BE USED TO DEFINE A QUANTITATIVE BASIS FOR THE HEALTH AND SAFETY CONTROL OF PNE'S. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 IAEA V 00642 01 OF 02 241713Z

END QUOTE. BEARING IN MIND GUIDANCE TO REMAIN NEUTRAL (PARA 7, REFTEL) WE SUCCEEDED IN MODIFYING THIS LANGUAGE AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF LARGE CRATERING PROJECTS REQUIRES DEFINITION OF ACCOMPANYING RADIATION EXPOSURES, PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM LONG DISTANCE FALLOUT LEVELS. A USEFUL AREA OF ACTIVITY FOR THE AGENCY MIGHT BE TO SEEK TO DEVELOP POSSIBLE TECHNICAL BASES WHICH COULD BE USED IN QUANTITATIVE STUDIES OF HEALT AND SAFETY ASPECTS OF SUCH PROJECTS.END

QUOTE. OTHER CONCLUSIONS DISCUSSED MODELS AND METHODS FOR PREDICT-  
ING RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF PNE PROJECTS;  
IMPROVING SEISMIC DAMAGE FORECASTING TECHNIQUES; IMPORTANCE OF  
PNE RESULTS IN OTHER SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH; IMPROVING KNOWLEDGE  
OF ROCK MECHANICS IN PNE APPLICATIONS; NEED TO EXPLORE TECHNICAL,  
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF USING PNE'S FOR CREATION OF  
SEABED STORAGE FOR PETROLEUM LIQUIDS; AND NEED TO MORE THOROUGHLY  
CONSIDER CONVENTIONAL ALTERNATIVES TO PNEJS. FINAL TEXT OF  
CONCLUSIONS WILL BE FORWARDED BY MISSION TO WASHINGTON WHEN  
RECEIVED.

5. NOTES OF TTB SIGNIFICANCE:

A. MYASNIKOV PRIVATELY REAFFIRMED 500 KT MAXIMUM FOR SALVO  
YIELD ON PECHORA-VOLGA PROJECT. WE NOW BELIEVE THE SOVIETS  
REALLY MEAN THIS. THE DECREASE FROM 3 MT MAXIMUM STATED IN 1971  
BILATERALS IS SIMPLY EXPLAINED. THEY HAVE REDUCED THE FORMER  
REQUIREMENT FOR THE CROSS-SECTION FROM 5000  
SQUARE METERS TO 2000 TO 2500 SQUARE METERS.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 IAEA V 00642 02 OF 02 241802Z

43

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-10 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15

RSC-01 CIAE-00 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 OES-03 FEAE-00

DODE-00 PA-01 USIA-06 PRS-01 ACDE-00 AF-06 ARA-06

EA-06 NEA-09 DLOS-03 COA-01 /110 W

----- 028464

P R 241627Z JAN 75

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5420

INFO AEC GERMANTOWN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 0642

NORDYKE BELIEVES THIS REDUCED CROSS-SECTION IS  
CONSISTENT AND ACHIEVABLE WITH 500 KT MAX.

B. THE BILATERAL SOVIET PAPER ON CRITERIA (CRECHUSHKINA)

WAS RETITLED FOR THE IAEA MEETING TO READ: "POSSIBLE TECHNICAL BASES FOR ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR SAFELY CONDUCTING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES." IT WAS GREATLY SHORTENED AND DID NOT MAKE REFERENCE TO A HYPOTHETICAL EXPLOSIVE. IT PROVOKED ONLY ONE QUESTION (UK) VIZ. HOW MANY EXPLOSIONS PER YEAR COULD YOU CONDUCT UNDER THESE RADIATION RESTRICTIONS? ANSWER: A FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER IF THE SR/CS DEPOSITION RESTRICTION DISTANCE IS SEVERAL HUNDRED KILOMETERS.

C. IT WAS CLEAR IN BOTH BILATERALS AND IAEA THAT THE MOTIVES TO CONSTRUCT THE PECHORA-VOLGA PROJECT ARE SEVERAL-FOLD. IT IS NOT ONLY TO STABILIZE CASPIAN BUT ALSO TO PROVIDE MORE IRRIGATION AND INDUSTRIAL WATER FROM RIVER SYSTEM AND TO PROVIDE HYDROELECTRIC POWER. THE MESSAGE WAS THAT IF THE CASPIAN PROBLEM DIDN'T EXIST OR GOES AWAY, THEY WOULD STILL WANT TO PROCEED. REP CANADA ASKED POINT BLANK IF THEY INTENDED TO PROCEED WITH CONSTRUCTION AND RECEIVED AN AMBIGUOUS ANSWER.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 IAEA V 00642 02 OF 02 241802Z

D. INDIAN PAPER PROVOKED MANY QUESTIONS, ALL STRICTLY TECHNICAL.

E. UK PAPER ON OIL STORAGE UNDER THE SEABED WAS BALANCED BUT SURPRISINGLY POSITIVE IN VIEW OF USUAL NEGATIVE UK VIEW ON PNE'S.

F. THAI PAPER ON KRA CONTAINED TWO PARAGRAPHS, THE FIRST EARLY AND THE SECOND LATE IN THE PAPER, BOTH QUOTED HERE:

QUOTE: BEFORE ANY DECISION TO USE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING WOULD BE TAKEN THE THAI AUTHORITIES UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD WISH TO ASSURE THEMSELVES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER TO THE POPULATION IN THE CONSTRUCTION AREA OR IN ADJOINING COUNTRIES, THAT IS USE WOULD BE IN THE BEST LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF THE THAI PEOPLE, AND THAT IT WOULD NOT IMPAIR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING STATES IN THE REGION. ONLY THEN WOULD THE THAI GOVERNMENT CONSIDER ENTERING INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH NUCLEAR POWERS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO OBTAIN THE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEVICES AND THE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY REQUIRED TO CONDUCT THIS LARGE-SCALE PNE PROJECT ON THAI SOIL. SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD NECESSARILY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND ANY PROCEDURES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN AGREED TO AT THE TIME.

BEFORE ANY FINAL DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE RESPONS-

BLE THAI AUTHORITIES, THEY MAY WISH TO SEEK CONFIRMATION OF THE SAFETY ANALYSES DESCRIBED HEREIN FROM THE WORLD AUTHORITIES AT THE IAEA. THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY MAY BE APPLICABLE SHOULD THE THAI GOVERNMENT DECIDE TO SEEK PNE ASSISTANCE. PROBABLY ONLY AFTER THE THAI GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED FORMAL ASSURANCES OF SAFETY FROM THE POWER OR POWERS PROVIDING THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AND THE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND THE CONSENT FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES WOULD IT AUTHORIZE THE USE OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES ON ITS SOIL. END QUOTE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 IAEA V 00642 02 OF 02 241802Z

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION (CANADA), AUTHOR STATED THAT THE THAI GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED A FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF SINGAPORE, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CANAL PROJECT WITHOUT REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE NUCLEAR APPROACH.

6. GUIDANCE IS REQUESTED ON SOVIET PROPOSED CHANGES TO RESPONSE TO INQUIRY (PARA 2) AND PRIVATE COMMUNIQUE (PARA 3). MYASNIKOV WILL REMAIN IN VIENNA UNTIL JANUARY 30 AND MISSION WILL COMMUNICATE US VIEWS TO MYASNIKOV AND SOV IAEA MISSION REPS. PORTER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 24 JAN 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975IAEAV00642  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750027-0661  
**From:** IAEA VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750124/aaaaaumf.tel  
**Line Count:** 251  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 75 STATE 15850  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 21 MAR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <21 MAR 2003 by CunninFX>; APPROVED <16 MAY 2003 by GarlanWA>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** US/USSR PNE BILATERAL AND IAEA TECHNICAL PNE MEETINGS  
**TAGS:** PARM, UR, US, IAEA  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006